## Provision-by-Provision Review of the New Amendment 3 (HJR 73, 2025)

#### Introduction

Missouri voters are being asked to replace the 2024 abortion amendment with a new constitutional section drafted by the General Assembly (HJR 73). While some describe this as a "pro-life improvement," the text still **constitutionalizes abortion exceptions**, creates **broad loopholes**, and **outsources enforcement** to future legislatures—with no guarantee that those legislators will act in ways that protect life. The following analysis walks through HJR 73 section by section.

# §36(a)(1) — State duty regarding "medical ethics"

What it says: Declares the state's duty to protect public health and the integrity/ethics of the medical profession, highlighting abortion and gender transition procedures as areas of moral concern.

# Our response:

- Reframing abortion as a matter of "medical ethics" risks normalizing it as "health care" rather than the taking of human life.
- Pairs abortion policy with gender-transition policy from the outset, setting up a multisubject constitutional section that is easier to sell politically but harder to challenge coherently.

## §36(a)(2) — Exceptions (rape, incest, fetal anomaly, medical emergency)

What it says: Allows abortion for medical emergency or fetal anomaly; and for rape or incest up to 12 weeks gestational age.

### Our response:

- **No verification standard**: There is **no requirement** that rape/incest be reported or otherwise verified, making the exception easy to claim and hard to police.
- "Fetal anomaly" swallows the rule: Diagnostic errors are common; many healthy children would be aborted under the anomaly exception.
- **Vague "medical emergency"**: Phrases like "irreversible impairment" are broad and invite expansive interpretation that can justify most abortions.
- **Unequal protection**: Some babies receive legal protection; others are expressly excluded.

## §36(a)(3) — Legislature may regulate abortion providers/facilities

What it says: The General Assembly may regulate providers, facilities, licensing/inspections, exams, gestational dating, and ultrasound performance.

### Our response:

- The verb is **permissive** ("may") **not mandatory** ("shall")—there is **no built-in enforcement** or penalty regime here.
- Enforcement therefore depends entirely on who controls the legislature. If radical Democrats regain control, they would have broad authority to rewrite or relax regulations in ways hostile to life, using §36(a)(3) as the vehicle.
- Even with a friendly majority, **future inaction** (or selective action) could leave loopholes wide open.

### §36(a)(4) — Ban on disability-based abortions

What it says: Prohibits abortion solely due to disability—except in cases of a "fetal anomaly."

# Our response:

- The **exception guts the rule**. Labeling a condition an "anomaly" becomes the pathway to the very disability-based abortions the provision claims to reject.
- Creates a false impression of strong protection for disabled children while keeping a large escape hatch.

## §36(a)(5) — Public funding limits

What it says: No public funds for abortion except in medical emergency, rape, or incest (as otherwise allowed by law).

### Our response:

• Still permits **taxpayer-funded abortions** in the exceptions and further normalizes abortion as "health care."

### §36(a)(6) — Informed consent; parental consent; judicial bypass

What it says: Requires voluntary and informed consent; minors need parental consent unless a court allows it; requires "medically accurate" information; allows the legislature to provide for court-ordered minor consent.

## Our (softened) response:

- Requiring informed consent and involving parents can be **positive** in principle.
- However, the judicial-bypass carve-out is vague and could circumvent parental involvement in practice.
- "Medically accurate" is undefined here and could, in effect, be standardized by abortion-industry guidelines—undermining true informed consent.

# §36(a)(7) — Fetal organ/tissue harvesting ban

What it says: Prohibits fetal organ harvesting after an abortion.

# Our response:

- We support a complete ban on any harvesting or commodification of fetal remains.
- That said, banning organ harvesting **does not address the core injustice**—this section still **permits abortions** under broad exceptions.

## §36(a)(8) — Miscarriage and ectopic pregnancy

What it says: Affirms that treatment of miscarriages and ectopic pregnancies (and other emergencies) is not infringed.

# Our response:

• **Misleading framing**: Treatment for miscarriage/ectopic pregnancy is **already lawful** in Missouri; invoking it here functions more as **messaging** than as needed reform.

### §36(a)(9) — Ban on gender transition procedures for minors

What it says: Bans surgeries and prohibits prescribing puberty blockers or cross-sex hormones for minors (with limited exceptions).

### **Context & response:**

- Missouri already has the SAFE Act (SB 49, 2023) restricting such care for minors; that
  medication portion sunsets Aug. 28, 2027 unless the sunset is removed. Missouri
  Senate+2AP News+2
- In 2025, legislation (e.g., **SB 249**) moved to **remove the 2027 expiration** and keep the protections in place via statute. Missouri Senate
- **Better approach:** maintain/strengthen this policy **through statute** that is less vulnerable to constitutional "single-subject" challenges tied to abortion, rather than welding unrelated subjects into one constitutional section.

# §36(a)(10) — All challenges must be filed in Cole County

What it says: All actions challenging state laws on "reproductive health care" must be brought in Cole County; the Attorney General must be notified and may intervene.

# Our response:

- Forces every Missourian into a **single venue**, limiting local access and concentrating power.
- Recent history: Lawmakers have targeted Cole County judges over controversial rulings (e.g., a 2025 bill seeking to remove Judge Cotton Walker), underscoring concerns about funneling all cases to one bench. Missouri Independent

# §36(a)(11) — Legislative authority to enact laws

What it says: The General Assembly has authority to enact laws to carry out this section.

## Our response:

- Again, permissive rather than mandatory. Protection hinges on future legislative will.
- As with §36(a)(3): if radical Democrats (or any abortion-friendly majority) take control, they can reshape regulations broadly in a direction hostile to life.

### $\S36(a)(12)$ — Definitions

What it says: Defines "fetal anomaly," "medical emergency," "reasonable medical judgment," and terms relating to gender-transition care. Notably, "medical emergency" includes ectopic pregnancy and miscarriage treatment.

### Our response:

• **Vague/broad terms** ("substantial and irreversible physical impairment," "reasonable medical judgment") invite **expansive interpretations**, making the exceptions easy to exploit.

### $\S36(a)(13)$ — Severability

What it says: If any provision is struck down, the remainder stands.

### Our response:

• Legislators often include explicit severability when they **expect court challenges**. This signals they know portions are **legally vulnerable**, but wish to **preserve the rest** (including the abortion permissions) even if courts strike pieces down.

### Conclusion

HJR 73 does not deliver equal protection for every unborn child. It **permits abortion** across multiple **broad exceptions**, **outsources enforcement** to an unpredictable legislature, **funnels lawsuits** to a single county, and **bundles** unrelated subjects that complicate legal defenses. Even well-intentioned elements (informed consent; bans on organ harvesting; public-funding limits) are overshadowed by **structural loopholes** and **permissive drafting**.

If we "trade" some lives to save others, how many will actually be saved—if any—once the exceptions, definitions, venue funnel, and legislative discretion are in play? Missouri can do better. We should reject HJR 73 and work for true equal protection that defends all unborn children without exception.